美國商會外文翻譯-其他專業(編輯修改稿)

　

【文章內容簡介】 ons. It allows the agency to impose fees on， and require reports from， employees， shareholders， directors and others. And It broadly subjects shareholders and directors to the Agency39。s authority， even with respect to activities unrelated to the covered person with which they are associated. The portion of the definition relating to independent contractors casts the even farther: Independent contractors are transformed into covered persons — and bee subject to regulations that didn39。t previously apply — if they recklessly have participated in a violation of any law. How can these entities protect themselves? Any association with a covered person that engages in wrongful conduct could trigger regulatory obligations that the contractor previously ignored， based on a very vague and uncertain standard. More importantly， that standard can be invoked in an action seeking damages by the agency， a State attorney general， or a plaintiffs39。 lawyer to whom a State attorney general has outsourced the case. This is a huge expansion of potential liability. We recognize that there is a similar concept， institutionrelated party， in the banking law. But the proposed use of the concept here is much broader — including imposing all of the agency39。s regulations on a previously unregulated party and subjecting that party to liability for classactiontype damages. Agency Authority to Expand its Own Jurisdiction Another troubling aspect of . 3126 is that it gives the agency the authority to expand its own jurisdiction. Including within the scope of financial activity any other activity that the agency defines， by regulation as financial activity for the purposes of this title. That opens the door to everexpanding jurisdiction through regulatory fiat and without congressional review. The revised draft includes standards that the agency must meet to expand its authority， but those standards impose no real limitations. The agency need only find that:1. the activity has， or there is likelihood that the activity will have， a material adverse impact on the creditworthiness or financial wellbeing of consumers， 2. the activity is incidental or plementary to any other financial activity regulated by the Agency， 3.the activity39。 is entered into or conducted as subterfuge or with a purpose to evade the provisions of the bill or existing consumer protection laws. These new standards for expanding the agency39。s authority are vague and vulnerable to varying interpretations — the substantial likelihood test gives the agency the ability to hypothesize adverse consequences and then extend its regulatory reach based on its own suspicions. And given the broadbased authority of the agency， there could be a relatively low threshold for defining activities as incidental or plementary (a term that appears to be drawn from banking law， where it did receive a broad interpretation). Vague Statutory Standards Another aspect of . 3126 that provoked considerable concern is the provision that， without any action by the agency， would have imposed vague regulatory standards upon covered persons — standards that would have required businesses to determine the extent to which consumers prehended particular information. Although this provision {Section 132(b)} has been removed from the revised bill， new language has been added to Section 138(1) making it unlawful for any person to engage in any unfair， deceptive， or abusive act or practice. This provision imposes broad liability on anyone — not just a covered person — any time the agency later determines that persons conduct i