關于價格戰外文文獻翻譯(編輯修改稿)

　

【文章內容簡介】 These and other lowcost batants are changing the nature of petition as executives knew it in the twentieth century. What should leaders do? I’m not the first academic (nor, I daresay, will I be the last) to pose that question. Several strategy experts, led by Harvard Business School’s Michael Porter in his work on petitive strategy and Clayton Christensen in his research on disruptive innovations, and Tuck School’s Richard D’Aveni in his writings on hyperpetition, have described the strategies panies can use to fight lowcost rivals. But that body of work doesn’t make the phenomenon less interesting—or render the threat any less formidable. For, despite the buckets of ink that academics have spilled on the topic, most panies behave as though lowcost petitors are no different from traditional rivals or as though they don’t matter. Over the past five years, I’ve studied around 50 incumbents and 25 lowcost businesses. My research shows that ignoring cutprice rivals is a mistake because it eventually forces panies to vacate entire market segments. When market leaders do respond, they often set off price wars, hurting themselves more than the challengers. Companies that wake up to that fact usually change course in one of two ways. Some bee more defensive and try to differentiate their products—a strategy that works only if they can meet a stringent set of conditions, which I describe later. Others take the offensive by launching lowcost businesses of their own. This socalled dual strategy succeeds only if panies can generate synergies between the existing businesses and the new ventures. If they cannot, panies are better off trying to transform themselves into solution providers or, difficult though it is, into lowcost players. Before I analyze the various strategy options, however, I must dispel some myths about lowcost businesses. The Sustainability of LowCost Businesses Be it in the classroom or the boardroom, executives invariably ask me the same question: Are lowcost businesses a permanent, enduring threat? Most managers believe they aren’t。 they’re convinced that a business that sells at prices dramatically lower than those incumbents charge must go bankrupt. They cite the experience of . airlines, which, after the industry’s deregulation in the 1980s, succeeded in beating off cutprice providers such as People Express. What they forget is that lowcost airlines soon reemerged. By slashing fares and cutting frills, entrants like Southwest Airlines and JetBlue have grabbed a chunk of America’s domestic air travel market. Unlike their predecessors, they’re making money hand over fist, too. Successful price warriors stay ahead of bigger rivals by using several tactics: They focus on just one or a few consumer segments。 they deliver the basic product or provide one benefit better than rivals do。 and they back everyday low prices with superefficient operations to keep costs down. That’s how Aldi, the Essenheadquartered retailer that owns Trader Joe’s in the ., has thrived in the brutally petitive German market. Aldi’s advantages start with the size of its product range. A typical Aldi outlet is a relatively small, 15,000squarefoot store that carries only about 700 products—95% of which are store brands—pared with the 25,000plus products that traditional supermarkets carry. The chain sells more of each product than rivals do, which enables it to negotiate lower prices and better quality with suppliers. In fact, many of Aldi’s privatelabel products have bested branded products in petitions and taste tests. The small number of products also keeps the pany’s supply chain agile. Another efficiency stems from the fact that Aldi sets up outlets on side streets in downtown areas and in suburbs, where real estate is relatively inexpensive. Since it uses small spaces, the pany’s startup costs are low, which enables it to blanket Aldi doesn’t pamper customers. Its stores display products on pallets rather than shelves in order to cut restocking time and save money. Customers bring their own shopping bags or buy them in the store. Aldi was one of the first retailers to require customers to pay refundable deposits for grocery carts. Shoppers return the carts to designated areas, sparing employees the time and energy needed to round them up. At the same time, Aldi gets the basics right. There are several checkout lines, so wait times are short even during peak shopping hours. Its scanning machines are lightning fast, which allows clerks to deal quickly with each shopper. Most retailers follow local pricing, but every Aldi store in a country charges the same price, which reinforces the chain’s image as a consumer champion. In 2020, Germans voted Aldi the country’s third mosttrusted brand, behind only Siemens and BMW. Aldi sells products far cheaper than rivals do. To suppliers’ prices, the pany adds about 8% to cover transportation, rent, marketing, and other overhead costs, and about 5% for staff costs. Thus, Aldi’s average markup is 13% while that of most European retailers is 28% to 30%. Not surprisingly, 89% of all German households made at least one trip to an Aldi in 2020, and according to European market research firms, the chain had a 20% share of Germany’s supermarket business. As Aldi’s story suggests, the financial calculations of lowcost players are different from those of established panies. They earn smaller gross margins than traditional players do, but their business models turn those into higher operating margins. Those operating margins are magnified by the businesses’ higherthanaverage asset turnover ratios, which result in impressive returns on assets. Because of those returns and high growth rates, the market capitalizations of many upstarts are higher than those of industry leaders, despite the larger equity bases of the