財務管理外文文獻及翻譯-公司治理與高管薪酬：一個應急框架(編輯修改稿)

　

【文章內容簡介】 , research on the economic effects of executive pensation has bee one of the hotly debated topics within corporate governance research. As Bruce, Buck, and Main (2021, p. 1493) indicated, ―In recent years, literature on executive remuneration has grown at a pace rivaled only by the growth of executive pay itself. Most of the empirical literature on executive pensation has focused predominantly on the ./. corporate sectors when analyzing anizational outes of different ponents of executive pay, such as cash pay (salary and bonus), longterm incentives (., executive stock options), and perquisites (., pension contributions and pany cars). In terms of its theoretical underpinnings, previous research has attempted to understand executive pensation in terms of agency theory and explored links between different forms of executive incentives and firm performance. This literature is motivated by the assumption that, by managing the principalagency problem between shareholders and managers, firms will operate more efficiently and perform better. Much of corporate governance research is based on a universal model outlined by principalagent theory (Fama amp。 Jensen, 1983。 Jensen, 1986), and the central premise of this framework is that shareholders and managers have different access to firmspecific information and broadly divergent interests and risk preferences. As a result, managers as agents of shareholders (principals) can engage in selfserving behavior that may be detrimental to shareholders’ wealth maximization. A substantial body of literature is based on this straightforward premise and suggests that, to constrain managerial opportunism, shareholders may use a diverse range of corporate governance mechanisms, including various equitybased managerial incentives that align the interests of agents and principals. As Jensen and Murphy (1990, pp. 242– 243) observed, ―Agency theory predicts that pensation policy will tie the agent’s expected utility to the principal’s objective. The objective of shareholders is to maximize wealth。 therefore agency theory predicts that CEO pensation policies will depend on changes in shareholder wealth.‖ The key metric in effecting positive anizational outes is payperformance sensitivity (Bruce et al., 2021). However, this ―closed system‖ approach, found predominantly within AngloAmerican agencybased literature, posits a universal set of linkages between executive incentives and performance and devotes little attention to the distinct contexts in which firms are embedded. Despite considerable research effort, the empirical findings on these causal linkages have been mixed and example, empirical studies and metaanalyses of the effects of executive equityrelated incentives on financial performance have failed to identify consistently significant effects (see, for example, the surveys and mentaries of Core, Guay, amp。 Larcker, 2021。 Daily, Dalton, amp。 Rajagopalan, 2021。 Hall, 2021。 and Tosi, Werner, Katz, amp。 GomezMejia, 2021). In a more recent critique of agency theory, Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, and Jackson (2021) pointed out its ―undercontextualized‖ nature and hence its inability to accurately pare and explain the diversity of corporate governance arrangements across different anizational and institutional contexts. Similarly, much of the resulting policy prescriptions enshrined in codes of ―good‖ corporate governance rely on universal notions of best practice, which often need to be adapted to the local contexts of firms or translated across diverse national institutional settings (Aguilera amp。 CuervoCazurra, 2021。 Aguilera amp。 Jackson, 2021。 Fiss amp。Zajac, 2021). In this paper we discuss an anizational approach to executive pensation that will better account for the interdependencies of incentive alignment with diverse anizational contexts and institutional environments. Building on research by Aguilera et al. (2021) we suggest that corporate governance aspects of executive pensation outlined by the agency and stakeholder perspectives must capture the patterned variation in corporate governance caused by differences in anizational contexts and their environment. Along these lines, we build on recent studies of corporate governance that have attempted to explainthe dynamic dimensions of corporate governance over the pany life cycle (Filatotchev amp。 Wright, 2021), as well as the diversity of corporate governance arrangements across countries (Aguilera amp。 Jackson, 2021。 Bruce at al., 2021). Thus, an important task in corporate governance research is to uncover the diversity of arrangements and to understand how the effectiveness of executive remuneration is mediated by its alignment with situational variables (―context‖) arising in diverse anizational contexts and institutional environments (Aguilera et al., 2021). We suggest a novel contingencybased framework for understanding the governance roles of executive pensation, which we conceptualize in terms of anizational context, plementarity/ substitution between governance factors, and the impact of institutional environments. Organizational context refers to variations in firms’ internal and external strategic resources and specific stages in their anizational life cycle (OLC). For example, older firms in the mature phases of their business life cycle may have a more diversified resource pool and ―professionalized‖ management team. As a result, they may be in greater need of formal incentive alignment mechanisms pared to younger, founderowned firms in their startup phase, which may have narrower resource bases and thus higher focus on reputational, capabilityrelated aspects of governance. Organizational context may affect not only potential benefits of executive pensation schemes, but also their costs, such as the direct costs of equitybased incenti