金融學專業外文翻譯-----股利政策，信號和現金流量：綜合辦法-金融財政(編輯修改稿)

　

【文章內容簡介】 ptalk. However, Wooldridge and Ghosh argue that managerial reputation may provide an important mechanism for providing credibility to corporate finance decisions. The role of reputation in dividend policy has been explored by Brucato and Smith (1997) and Gillet et al. (2020). In Brucato and Smith, a reputable dividend signal is one where an unexpected dividend increase is confirmed by a subsequent unexpected earnings increase. Similarly, in Gillet et al., the reputation mechanism is such that the market punishes a firm that chooses a high dividend (in order to ―fool‖ the market that it is a highine firm), but subsequently reports low profitability. In contrast, in our model, we consider the role of managerial reputation in allowing a firm to municate that it is cutting the dividend in order to invest in a new valueadding project. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our model. In section , we consider our free cashflow case. In section , we consider our adverse selection case, and consider the role of munication and reputation. In section 4, we discuss practical and managerial implications of our model. Furthermore, in the light of our model, we consider some anecdotal evidence demonstrating the plexities surrounding dividend policy. Section 5 concludes. Our dividend signaling model demonstrates that dividend policy is indeed plex. We have demonstrated that high dividends may have a positive effect on firm value, both by providing a positive signal of current performance (in terms of current ine), and in reducing the free cashflow problem (that is, the temptation for the manager to invest in negative NPV projects due to private benefits). However, when good positive NPV investment opportunities are available, a high dividend may indeed be value reducing if it prevents firms from being able to make these investments. However, management may refuse to cut dividends, thereby passing up these positive NPV opportunities, especially if the stock market has been conditioned to believe that high dividends signal a highquality firm. Our model thus emphasized managerial munication/education of investors, supported by managerial reputation considerations, as a means of eliminating this problem. We now consider some anecdotal evidence that provides a practical perspective to our theory, and demonstrates the realworld confusion surrounding dividend policy. The ―traditional‖ positive relationship between dividends and firm value Lease et al. (2020) provide the following examples where the market reacted in the ―standard‖ way, that is, positively (negatively) to dividend increases (decreases): Figgie International announced a cut in its quarterly dividend. on the announcement Figgie39。s stock price declined. Bethlehem Steel Corporation announced that it was omitting its quarterly dividend. Its share price fell. WalMart Stores announced an increase in its quarterly dividend. WalMart39。s share price increased. Procter and Gamble Company announced an annual dividend increase on the announcement, P and G39。s share price increased. However, Lease et al. (2020) demonstrate that management understands that high dividends may restrict corporate investment in valuecreation: Elisabeth Goth, a dissident member of the family that controls Dow Jones and Co., raises questions about its dividend policy, contending that Dow Jones has increased its dividends at the expense of reinvesting its earnings to fuel future growth. However, ―shareholders who enjoyed stock runups and rising dividends in the 1980s are unhappy that Bell CEOs want to curb dividend growth and use profits to improve their works and diversify at home and abroad‖. This suggests that investors may understand that dividends may need to be cut to invest in pany growth, but they still demand dividends. Dividend cuts are not always bad news! Our analysis revealed that dividend cuts are not always bad news, especially when a firm has significant growth opportunities available. However, we demonstrated that managers may refuse to cut dividends for fear of negative market reaction (which may be driven by investors being behaviorally conditioned to believe that dividend cuts are bad news). Our model suggested that the problem may be mitigated if managers can municate the reasons for dividend cuts (to invest in new valueadding projects), supported by managerial reputation effects. Indeed, Cohen and Yagil39。s (2020) international survey of CFOs of major panies in USA, UK, Germany, Canada and Japan reveals that this agency problem exists. The authors argue that managers should consider two factors when deciding whether to cut dividends: 1. How sensitive is the stock price to dividend changes (the adverse selection problem)? 2. To what extent can managers transfer information (that is municate) about the profitable investment opportunity so th