金融學外文翻譯word版(編輯修改稿)

　

【文章內容簡介】 es can be used as a taxonomy with minimal mathematics because understanding prototypical games— like those discussed in this chapter— requires nothing beyond simple logic.The most central concept in game theory is Nash equilibrium. A set of strategies (one for each player) form an equilibrium if each player is choosing the strategy which is a best response (., gives the highest expected utility) to the other players’ strategies. Attention is focussed on equilibrium because players who are constantly switching to better strategies, given what others have done, will generally end up at an equilibrium. Increasingly, game theorists are interested in the dynamics of equilibration as well, in the form of evolution of populations of player strategies (Weibull, 1995)。 or learning by individuals from experience (., Fudenberg and Levine, 1998。 Camerer and Ho, 1999). 3. Theories of social preferences Within economics, the leading explanation for the patterns of results described above is that agents have social preferences (or “social utility”) which take into account the payoffs and perhaps intentions of others. Roughly speaking, social preference theories assume that people have stable preferences for how money is allocated (which may depend on who the other player is, or how the allocation came about), much as they are assumed in economics to have preferences for food, the present versus the future, how close their house is to work, and so Cultural anthropologists and evolutionary psychologists have sought to explain the origin of these preferences. One idea is that in the environment of evolutionary adaptation (EEA) or ancestral past, people mostly engaged in repeated games with people they knew. Evolution created specialized cognitive heuristics for playing repeated games efficiently. It is wellknown in game theory that behavior which is optimal for a selfinterested actor in a oneperiod game with a stranger such as defecting or free riding, accepting all ultimatum offers is not always optimal in repeated games with partners. In a repeated ultimatum game, for example, it pays to reject offers to build up a reputation for being hard to push around, which leads to more generous offers in the future. In the unnatural habitat view, subjects cannot “turn off” the habitual behavior shaped by repeatedgame life in the EEA when they play single games with strangers in the lab. An important modification of this view is that evolution did not equip all people with identical hardwired instincts for playing games, but instead created the capacity for learning social norms. The latter view can explain why different cultures would have different norms. 4. Why do game experiments? And which games? A central advantage of experimental games is parability across subject pools (provided great care is taken in controlling for differences in language, purchasing power of outes, interactions with experimenters, and