江陰化纖產(chǎn)業(yè)應(yīng)對反傾銷的問題研究國際貿(mào)易實習(xí)論文-資料下載頁

　　

【正文】 應(yīng)訴費用巨大，單個企業(yè)難以承受的困難。對獲得勝訴者，可給予適當(dāng)?shù)慕?jīng)濟(jì)獎勵。，對反傾銷調(diào)查方施加壓力近年來，我國不斷地遭受世界各國不公正的反傾銷指控與制裁，使得對外經(jīng)濟(jì)一再受到影響。而在國內(nèi)來看，我國的各個企業(yè)卻同樣承受著來自國外各行業(yè)的傾銷沖擊。在這雙重打壓之下，我國對外經(jīng)濟(jì)受到的影響是可想而知的。這種情況使我國逐漸認(rèn)識到規(guī)范、合理地使用反傾銷措施，可以正當(dāng)?shù)木S護(hù)我國企業(yè)的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益。在別國對我們進(jìn)行傾銷時，應(yīng)當(dāng)積極應(yīng)對，從而打壓國外對華傾銷與反傾銷的囂張氣焰，濫用反傾銷手段的情況也將得到有效控制。面對國際市場日趨激烈的競爭態(tài)勢及國外頻繁對我聚酯短纖反傾銷的嚴(yán)峻形勢，相關(guān)企業(yè)要加快結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整和產(chǎn)業(yè)升級，提高技術(shù)設(shè)備水平；要加強(qiáng)自主創(chuàng)新，加大研發(fā)投入，努力提升產(chǎn)品的核心競爭力；要加強(qiáng)產(chǎn)業(yè)規(guī)劃，加大產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈的優(yōu)化整合力度，實行差別化發(fā)展，不斷提高產(chǎn)品附加值。只有這樣，化纖行業(yè)才能實現(xiàn)可持續(xù)發(fā)展。，積極應(yīng)訴在做國際貿(mào)易出口時，出口貿(mào)易企業(yè)應(yīng)關(guān)注當(dāng)?shù)厥袌龅淖呦颍熘O當(dāng)?shù)胤伞Ｒ詡涑隹诘匕l(fā)起反傾銷調(diào)查以提案。我國出口企業(yè)要提高反傾銷的主動性，提高自我保護(hù)意識。同時熟悉反傾銷的知識，提高應(yīng)訴意識以及能力。我國企業(yè)要經(jīng)常地對國外市場進(jìn)行調(diào)研工作，特別要對進(jìn)口國同類產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)商的產(chǎn)銷狀況、經(jīng)營狀況和行業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況等，從而可以檢測出進(jìn)口國生產(chǎn)商是否有反傾銷的動向，從而在可能提出反傾銷申訴之前，提前做好準(zhǔn)備工作，以免對突如其來的反傾銷申訴措手不及，做到防患于未然。就對內(nèi)外貿(mào)單據(jù)分類歸檔，內(nèi)外貿(mào)成本分開獨立核銷，各類費用不可混在一起。對各類憑證一定整理到位，從采購原料到生產(chǎn)出成品出口直至貨款到帳過程中產(chǎn)生的各種費用明細(xì)賬單都分類記賬。外貿(mào)相對于內(nèi)銷來說涉及更多的流程，包括海關(guān)，國稅，外匯管理局，銀行等不同部門，組織機(jī)構(gòu)，產(chǎn)生的各種單據(jù)，憑證，費用類別也更多。所以外貿(mào)業(yè)務(wù)單據(jù)必須保存完整，每筆業(yè)務(wù)下的產(chǎn)生的費用憑證必須明確，相關(guān)費用憑證需要復(fù)印留底，使每筆業(yè)務(wù)成本、利潤都有據(jù)可查。出口企業(yè)應(yīng)加強(qiáng)信息管理制度，注重本企業(yè)生產(chǎn)資料的手機(jī)和保存，以防止反傾銷方調(diào)查，以便在國外相關(guān)機(jī)構(gòu)來調(diào)查時可以迅速，準(zhǔn)確的拿出單據(jù)，對其提出的在價格，成本相關(guān)方面的要求，予以準(zhǔn)確的回復(fù)，給其留下良好的影響。隨著國際競爭的日益激烈，出口商品要具有其競爭優(yōu)勢，就要不斷提高產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量，提升產(chǎn)品檔次，做好對國外市場的調(diào)研工作，優(yōu)化市場結(jié)構(gòu)，學(xué)會使用商標(biāo)、包裝、公關(guān)、廣告等非價格競爭手段，從而使產(chǎn)品由單一化逐漸轉(zhuǎn)變成為高技術(shù)含量、高附加值形態(tài)。出口產(chǎn)品競爭應(yīng)該從價格競爭為主向以質(zhì)量、技術(shù)、服務(wù)等非價格競爭為主轉(zhuǎn)變。同時，我國出口企業(yè)要創(chuàng)立自己的國際市場，制定有力的政策措施，在繼續(xù)美國、歐盟、日本等發(fā)達(dá)國家之間的貿(mào)易往來之外，鼓勵開拓亞非拉市場，實行市場多元化戰(zhàn)略。從而避免“雞蛋放在一個籃子里”的情形的出現(xiàn)，降低了貿(mào)易風(fēng)險，從而減少了反傾銷問題的發(fā)生率。我國出口企業(yè)應(yīng)提高產(chǎn)品技術(shù)含量，發(fā)展新產(chǎn)品，區(qū)別于國外當(dāng)?shù)厥袌霎a(chǎn)品。同時對外貿(mào)易業(yè)務(wù)拓展不能局限于一個市場，需多點開花，對每個市場的法律政策變化需要及時了解，對重點市場的市場信息，行業(yè)信息更需要及時把握，如有法律政策方面的變化就需要及時調(diào)整市場營銷方面的對策。我國企業(yè)要走市場多元化、分散化的道路，從而避免出口市場的過分集中而導(dǎo)致反傾銷。低于競爭對手的成本而不是最低成本，這一戰(zhàn)略的優(yōu)點是能夠快速占領(lǐng)市場份額，而在于進(jìn)入國外市場容易被認(rèn)定為反傾銷。出口企業(yè)需要誠信，避免信息誤導(dǎo)。同時，創(chuàng)品牌的本質(zhì)圍繞提高質(zhì)量，利用科技發(fā)展核心技術(shù)提高競爭力，這種差異化競爭通常很難復(fù)制，從而避免企業(yè)進(jìn)入低價競爭。只有這樣，出口企業(yè)才能在殘酷的市場競爭中得以生存和發(fā)展。 6 結(jié)束語改革開放以來，中國出口在很多方面都處在被動的地位，即使是在加入WTO之后，也并未對我國的外貿(mào)市場帶來很大的機(jī)遇，挑戰(zhàn)卻連連不斷。由于商品的交換而產(chǎn)生了貿(mào)易，國與國之間商品的交換就是對外貿(mào)易。而在貿(mào)易中由于一國的原因而造成的傾銷，進(jìn)口國就有權(quán)利去申訴，抵制這一不正當(dāng)競爭行為，從而使得本國相關(guān)產(chǎn)業(yè)得到有效保護(hù)。但是在越來越多的反傾銷案例中，真正的傾銷案件少之又少，更多國家已經(jīng)把反傾銷作為產(chǎn)業(yè)保護(hù)主義的一個手段，使得濫用情況頻發(fā)，每年的反傾銷案件不斷增加，而中國這塊肉餅更是成為了各國反傾銷的主要針對國。本文從江陰海倫化纖公司的印度尼西亞對原產(chǎn)自中國的聚酯短纖反傾銷案例引出，分析外國對江陰化纖產(chǎn)業(yè)反傾銷的特點，擴(kuò)展到我國化纖產(chǎn)業(yè)，并深入地研究后找到相關(guān)原因，并給出了應(yīng)對措施。在其中最重要的則是中國的“非市場經(jīng)濟(jì)”，這是諸多國家對我國實施反傾銷申訴屢試不爽的金鑰匙，而我國也在不斷地去努力擺脫這一現(xiàn)狀。而另一方面中國的對外貿(mào)易體制不夠健全，沒有完整的傾銷與反傾銷的相關(guān)法律政策，使得企業(yè)對反傾銷概念不夠了解，等到申訴到來時為時已晚。綜上所述，國外對華反傾銷的情況在短時間內(nèi)不會改變，但是我國政府和企業(yè)要積極地去應(yīng)對，抵制不正當(dāng)?shù)姆磧A銷申訴，從而使濫用反傾銷手段得到有效控制，使得我國外貿(mào)經(jīng)濟(jì)能夠良性發(fā)展下去。49參考文獻(xiàn)[1] 和反傾銷規(guī)則初探[J].金山企業(yè)管理,2001,(02)[2][J].中國市場,2011.(06)[3][J]. 蚌埠黨校學(xué)報, 2004,(04)[4]中國企業(yè)應(yīng)如何應(yīng)對歐盟的反傾銷政策[J]. 現(xiàn)代焊接, 2001,(01)[5][J]. 當(dāng)代經(jīng)濟(jì)(下半月), 2007,(01) [6][J]. 湖北水利水電職業(yè)技術(shù)學(xué)院學(xué)報, 2010,(04)[7][J].China39。s Foreign Trade,2011,(02)[8][J].經(jīng)濟(jì)研究導(dǎo)刊,2011,(06)[9][J].合作經(jīng)濟(jì)與科技,2010,(03)[10][J].探索者學(xué)刊,2002,(01)[11][J].探索者學(xué)刊,2002,(01)[12][J].財經(jīng)政法資訊,2006,(01)[13][J].學(xué)術(shù)問題研究,2005,(01)[14]、印度反傾銷制度規(guī)則比較[J].商業(yè)時代,2011,(07)[15]、國別分布與產(chǎn)品結(jié)構(gòu)1995～2008[J].國際經(jīng)貿(mào)探索,2010,(01)[16]廖良美,[J].商業(yè)時代,2004,(30)[17][J].黑龍江對外經(jīng)貿(mào),2007,(08)[18][J].財貿(mào)研究,2006,(01)[19]“非市場經(jīng)濟(jì)”條款之困境[J].研究生法學(xué),2007,(01)[20][J].法商研究,2007,(04)[21][J].法制與社會,2006,(20)[22]周顯志,[J].國際經(jīng)貿(mào)探索, 2003,(01)[23]Uwe Dulleck,WTO39。s Antidumping Rule and the Protection of Incumbents,Journal of International Trade amp。 Economic Development,Vol. 14,No. 2,229239,June 2005[24]Reid Bolton, AntiDumping and DistrustReducing AntiDumping Duties under the . Through Heightened Scrutiny,SelectedWorks,July 2010英文原文AntiDumping and Distrust: Reducing AntiDumping Duties under the . Through Heightened ScrutinyII. LEGAL CAPACITY AND ANTIDUMPING DUTIESAs the above section demonstrated, there are a host of problems with the way antidumping duties are assessed. What can explain the striking lack of plaints against many antidumping duties? One potential explanation is that decisions to impose antidumping duties are based on market power—a form of realpolitik where smaller market members fear angering larger market members. Yet this hypothesis has been discredited in favor of the idea of legal capacity. Legal capacity can not only predict which counties will impose antidumping duties, but even more importantly, it can predict which country will be targeted by the duties and whether or not the targeted country will challenge the antidumping duties in front of the .39。s dispute settlement body.Legal capacity can be defined as the institutional, financial, and human resources available to pursue a case. This characteristic is important for . members due to the increasing judicialization of international trade dispute settlement and the large amount of time, energy, and expertise required to initiate a dispute in front of the . and see it through to conclusion. The average length of time between identifying the violation, researching the appropriate arguments, filing a plaint, engaging in consultations, arguing in front of a panel and then in front of the appellate body is 15 months. These cases also require legal fees in the hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of dollars.Legal capacity is not political power and does not correspond to the cleavage between developing and industrialized countries. While many developing countries do have low legal capacity and tend to avoid the .39。s dispute settlement system, other developing country members of the ., such as China, India, and Brazil, nonetheless can defend their interests in . litigation due to the size of their economy notwithstanding their low . per capita.Over the last decade, numerous studies have examined the effect of legal capacity on . dispute settlements and found that those countries with the most sophisticated legal capacity have been the ones least targeted by antidumping measures as well as the most likely to dispute (and therefore win, since most plaints against antidumping duties end favorably) challenges to disputed antidumping duties. This evidence suggests that the most important factor in creating a trademaximizing . is not inherently endogenous to the countries themselves, but rather related to the plexity of the . dispute settlement system and the resources required to navigate it.For example, research shows that low capacity countries are the most frequent targets of antidumping duties and are least likely to challenge those duties. This