風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資中風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分析與規(guī)避畢業(yè)論文-資料下載頁
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【正文】 s risky than their lower quality counterparts. Quality may affect investment duration in one of two primary ways. The first is our null hypothesis. Venture capitalists certify the quality of the firms in which they invest through their involvement and assistance in the management of their investees. Thus, our null hypothesis is that venture capitalists will therefore invest in higher quality firms over a longer duration to maximize their value upon exit by contributing the appropriate time and effort to enable new owners to resolve informational asymmetry associated with their new investee. iii)HighTechnology InvestmentsMoral hazard costs may be inherent in high technology industries as the assets in hightechnology firms are highly specific. Adverse selection costs also tend to be relatively more significant for hightechnology firms as their assets are predominantly intangible, especially in their earlier stages. Taken together, to the extent that there are high moral hazard costs and high hidden information costs inherent in hightechnology firms, our null hypothesis is that hightechnology investments will be over a longer total duration. Longer investment duration enables the VC to minimize the pronounced agency costs between hightechnology entrepreneurial firms and their new owners, and therefore maximize the value of the firm upon exit. On the other hand, as hightechnology entrepreneurs are highly motivated selfselecting individuals, hidden action costs associated with financing among hightechnology entrepreneurs may be trivial. Duration will therefore be independent of technology insofar as agency costs among hightechnology firms are trivial. Rather, the duration of technology investments is typically influenced by a plethora of other factors. For example, biotechnology tends to be very longterm as a result of a long development period。 whereas software is of short duration. vi) Reason for ExitExit may be preplanned, or inspired by an unsolicited offer. One may expect preplanned exits to be over a shorter duration. Unsolicited offers present the VC with an opportunity to exit prior to the time at which exit was anticipated. Thus, we would also expect that the acceptance of an unsolicited offer to be associated with investments of a shorter duration. Market conditions may also be the underlying reason for exit. Note, however, that investment duration will not necessarily be affected by market conditions in any particular direction as expectations may vary independently of the market conditions at any given point in time. A dummy variable for VC exits for reasons of market conditions is also included in the econometric analysis as a control variable. We include such this dummy variable to account for the fact that our data does not prise a full business cycle. vii) Exit StrategyA partial exit strategy in our data means that the VC retains part of the investment for at least one year after the VC39。s first sale of shares. The extent of exit raises the issue of certification. Partial exits enable the venture capitalist to certify the quality of the entrepreneurial firm and better mitigate informational asymmetry between the entrepreneurial firm and its new owners. Younger firms with a short track record and firms without significant assistance from a venture capitalist over a long duration benefit from the certification advantage associated with a partial exit strategy. We therefore expect that the causal relation between investment duration and extent of exit to be from investment duration to the extent of exit。 this conjecture is tested in the empirical analysis in the Appendix. In addition to full and partial exits, exit strategy also enpasses choice of exit vehicle. In our related research we show that total investment duration impacts the choice of exit vehicle. The possibility that choice of exit vehicle causes total investment duration was also assessed in the analysis。 however, the theory and empirical evidence predominantly indicated causality from duration to exit strategy. The intuition for this result is as follows. Different exit vehicles enable informational asymmetry between the entrepreneurial firm and their new owners to be mitigated to different longer VC investment duration mitigates informational asymmetries between the entrepreneurial firm and the new owners, the need to select an exit vehicle that facilitates mitigation of informational asymmetry is less pronounced. Therefore, causality is from total investment duration to choice of exit vehicle. In sum, the choice of investment duration depends on conditions of asymmetric information. Efficient investment duration will be tailored to mitigate asymmetric information between the entrepreneurial firm its the new owners, and will therefore depend upon firm quality, the stage of the firm39。s development, the nature of its assets, the structure of the investment and the exit strategy. Duration will also be affected when exit is preplanned or by reason of an unsolicited offer. Finally, duration may also be influenced the availability of capital for investment by the VC and the multitask nature of a venture capitalist39。s activities. In addition to these economic factors, legal and institutional barriers to efficient exit may influence investment durati
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